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OJO

MONETARY POLICY IN NIGERIA IN TI-IE 1980s
AND PROSPECTS IN TI-IE 1990s*
DRM.O.OJO

The main aim of the paper is to review the evolution and perfonnance qf monetwy policy tn Nigeria tn the
1980s. Moneta,y policy objectives rematned broadly the same throughout the review period· slimulatton of
output and employment, promotion of stable prices and support of external equilibrium The direct monetary
controlframeworkentailingtheprescripttonqfaggregatecreditceilings,selectivecreditcontrolsandregulatton
of interest rates, was prominently used between 1980 and 1985, and although was generally retaJn.edfrom
1986, there was some degree qfliberalizatton tn line with the general philosophy of the Structu.raLA4}ustment
Programme. Moneta,y policy faced tncreastng dt.fllculties due tn large part to the Inadequacy of the control
framework and absence of htu,nontsatton between monetwy andjlscal policies. Under these circumstances,
macroeconomic variables moued tn undesirable directtons for most qf the decade. The announced movement
to market-based Instruments of moneta,y control ts a logicalfollnw·up to the .financial deregulation already
embarlced upon under SAP and the poor performance of direct moneta,y control. For effective use qf such
Instruments. however, someconstraJn.ts must beelimtnated or reduced substantially. These Include thearess
liquidity tn the economy, co'lflict between moneta,y andjlscal policies, Inadequate competttton tn the banking
system. large leakages tn the monetary control system and Inadequate data base.

INTRODUCTION

Monetaiy policy in Nigerta has been conducted under wide-ranging economic environments since the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigerta (CBN) over thirty
years ago. The first twenty years of the emergence of the CBN was charactertsed by an
economic environment that w-.s relatively stable and congenial for monetary management. although both the civil war (1966-1970) and post-war boom and reconstruction posed sertous challenges to the monetaiy authortties. With the signiflcant
increase in capital formation and domestic output in the 1960s and 1970s, monetaiy
management generally came under less pressure. However, the growing involvement
of the public sector in economic activities that are traditionally restrtcted to prtvate
enterprtse in a mixed economy, as well as the over-dependence of the economy on the
external sector, particularly in the second half of the pertod, increasingly put greater
pressure on monetary management. The development of macroeconomic policy durtng
those twentyyears as it related especially to CBN operations has been well documented
earlier (CBN, Research Department. 1979). In contrast, however, the 1980s imposed
a lot of trauma on the conduct of monetaiy policy. The early part of the pertod witnesseda dramatic downturn of the international oil market in terms of declining oil prtces and
export earnings which had sertous implications for fiscal and monetaiy policies, while
the latter part saw the introduction ofan inevitable economic adjustment In which
monetaiy policy appeared to have borne a relatively heavy share of the burden of
adjustment. There Is as yet no systematic documentation of the performance of
monetaiy policy durtng this pertod.
The full version of this paper has been published as Research Depl Occaalonal Paper No. 2, Feb, 1992. The author
gratefully acknowledges comments on an earlier draft of the paper by Chief E. E. lnang. Deputy Director and Mr. J.
K. A. Olekah, Aasfstant Director both of the Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria. The Views expressed In
the paper arc those of the author and not necessarily shared by the CBN as an Institution.
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The main purpose of this paper ls therefore to discuss the evolution and performance
of Nigeria's monetruy policy In the 1980s. This exercise will serve as an up-date of the
reviews undertaken In the period ending 1979. In the process, more light will be thrown
on monetary policy and management techniques before the adoption of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) and in the course of the prospects for more effective
monetruy management In the 1990s having regard to the on-going reforms of the
monetruy policy process Itself and the financial system in general, as well as the need
for greater integration of monetary and fiscal policies. These aspects have also to be
examined against the background of the desirable goals of national economic
development
Towards achieving Its main objectives, the paper Is organised Into four main parts.
Part I contains a brief survey of monetruy policy and the economy up to 1979, thus
providing the setting for the design and implementation of monetary policy In the
1980s. Parts II and III address the core Issues in the study- the nature of the monetruy
policy Instruments adopted, their effects on the monetary sector and the economy, as
well as the major constraints on policy Implementation. While Part II examines the
period 1980-1985, Part III reviews the situation during 1986-1989. Part IV ts
devoted to a consideration of the prospects for monetruy policy in the 1990s. with
specific focus on the on-going reforms of the monetruy policy and the financial system
and the quest for proper integration of monetary and fiscal policies.
PART I
1l-lE NIGERIAN ECONOMY AND MONETARY POLICY IN IBE 1970s

This part provides a specific background to the operation of monetruy policy in the
1980s which is the central focus of this paper. It is intended to discuss briefly the
features of the Nigerian economy, monetruy policy objectives and instruments, the
effects of monetary policy and the constraints facing monetary policy In. the 1970s. All
these will hopefully help to articulate the nature of the problems monetruy policy had
to grapple with both before and during the periods of economic adjustment In the
1980s.
Economic Profile

Features of the Nigerian economy in the 1970s were dictated by the growing
importance of petroleum. the expanding role of the public sector in the economy and
an unsustainable dependence on the external sector. Owing to the signlflcant increase
in capital formation based on oil Income, domestic output grew rapidly, but agriculture
was a drag on the economy because of its sluggish performance. Following the large
increase in foreign exchange earnings from oil which were largely monetised, public
sector involvement in direct economic activities escalated. The enhanced government
revenue notwithstanding, fiscal deficits especially after 1974 soared. Also, because of
the increasing over-dependence on the external sector, external equilibrium which was
quite visible early In the period had virtually disappeared. Inflationary pressures
mounted, while monetruy management began to experience serious difficulties. These
are further articulated below.
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Although industrial performance appeared satisfactory, the dominance of the oil
sector in this performance was rather disturbing, while the over-dependence of
manufacturing production on imported raw materials made its achieved performance
rather unsustainable. The stagnating agricultural production was caused partly by its
undue dependence on the vagaries of the weather and partly due to the low level of
investment in the sector which was brought about by the pattern of investment
incentives and returns which made the non-agricultural sectors more attractive. The
dominance of the public sector in economic activities was promoted by the strategy to
utilise the large public resources to expand infrastructural facilities and build up the
country's industrial base. The increasing role !)f public expenditure in determining the
course of economic development was boosted by the rapid growth of government
institutions. Suddenly, the number of States increased from 12 to 19, while the
number of Federal Government Universities alone increased from 6 to 13. The
introduction ofa gigantic Universal Primary Education Scheme and the reform of the
local government system also added to the government expenditure bill. The balance
of payments position in the 1970s presented a picture oflarge surpluses in the early
part of the period followed by reduced surpluses and the emergence ofdeficits from the
middle part of the period. These trends were greatly determined by developments in the
oil sector as well as changes in government policies. 'Ibis was reflected in the increased
share of the oil sector in export trade from under 60 per cent in 1970 to over 90 per cent
starting from 1973. While oil exports were on the upward trend, non-oil exports
declined proportionately. from 30 per cent of aggregate exports in 1970 to less than 10
per cent at the end of the decade. However, it should be observed that an important
factor in this development was the ban imposed by Government during the second half
of the period on the exports of non-oil commodities in order to satisfy the excess
demand for these commodities in the domestic market. Another factor in the
deteriorating external payments position was":~~ !Ilountlng public expenditure by
reason of its high import content and also due to ~timulus
it gave to private sector
Y,,
imports.
With the large increases in government expenditure, the financial sector expertenced rapid monetary expansion in the 1970s because these expenditures stemmed
from the monetization of its huge oil revenues. There was also significant expansion
of bank credit as another stimulus to monetary growth during the period. Under these
circumstances, especially in a situation of increased aggregate demand when output
response to domestic requirements was not sufficiently elastic, inflationary pressures
intensified in the 1970s. A vivid illustration of the general attitude of the Government
was its decision to award large salary increases with retrospective effect to its workers
in 1975. Private sector enterprises took similar action. Consequently. inflationary
pressures intensified while further erosion of external stability was encouraged. Thus,
towards the end of the 1970s, monetary management came under severe pressures
arising mainly from the increased spending of oil money. The monetary policy
management process during the period needs some articulation.
Monetary Policy

In the specific economic environment of the 1970s, the main objectives of monetary
policy were the maintenance of relative price stability and a healthy balance of

4

CBN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAi.

R~:v1~:w, VOi•. :m, NO.

I

payments position, as well as the acceleration of the pace of economic development.
Generally. monetary control depended on the use of direct monetary Instruments such
as selective credit controls and credit ceilings, Interest rate controls. prescription of
cash reserve requi-rements. exchange rate control and imposition or special deposits.
The use of market-based instnunenls such as open market operations was not lt-asible
at that point because of the extreme narrowness and underdeveloped nature of the
financial markets. the inadequate supply of the relevant debt instmments and the
deliberate restraint on interest rates. It is useful to review b1·ielly the application of the
direct monetary instnunents.
Probably the most popular instrnment of monetmy policy was the issuance ofrredit
rationing guidelines which was a continuation of pre-war monetmy management
technique. Up to March 1972 and from April 1976--1979, the credit control guidelines
took the fonn of setting the rates of change for the aggregate and components of
commercial bank loans and advances. Between April 1972 and March 1976. the use
of aggregate credit ceiling was dropped while the specilkation of a sectornl distribu lion
of credit was in vogue. The focus on sectoral distribution ofbankcredit throughout the
period was to stimulate the productive sectors and consequently stem inllatinna1y
pressures. The streamlining oft he interest rate stn1cture and downward inch1cement
of the rates were also an important policy instrument. The aim was to stimulate
investment and growth. A number of special deposits were also imposed on the banks
to reduce their free rese1ves and credit creating capacity. Cash ratios (cash as ratio of
demand deposits) were imposed on the banks in 1976/77 on the basis of a four-group
classi11cat ion based on the size of total deposit liabilities of the banks. Generally, these
cash r._.iios were lower than those voluntarily maintained by the banks, thereby
rendering them inellective as a restraint on their credit 01x~ralions. Bui the freezing
order on importers· advance deposits in the banks against letters of credit and the
issuance of stabilization securities were quite elkctive i11stn111w11ts of 111011cta1y
control.
Table I shows the outcomes of monetary policy measures and the extent to which
objectives were achieved. Looking at the sub-peri<xls of 1970---74 and 1975-79 as
indicated in the Table shows dea~ly that it became more dilHcult to attain policy
objectives in the second period as monetary aMregates, the fiscal deficit, GDP growth
rate, inflation rate and balance of payments position moved in undesirable directions.
Narrow and broad money grew by an average of 41.4 and 3G.9 per cent, respectively,
in the second,s11b-pcriocl, as against 2'1.5 and 24.3 per cent in the first sub-period.
Growth in the net domestic credit, especially to the government sector became the
major cause of rapid monetary expansion in contrast to the earlier period when the
growth in net foreign assets was the major expansionary factor. From a rx>sition of
surplus in 1970-7'1, Federal Government fiscal opera~ions resulted in incn~~tsed
deficits wltic:h averaged 6.1 percent ofno,ninal CDP in 1975---79. The GDP growth rate
declined from l 0.3 lo 6.4 per cent belwf'en llw two sub-periods while !he inllalion rate
jumped from 10.4 to 20.3 per cent. The balance of payments posit ion moved from· a
buoyant surplus to deficit within the decree under review.
It is, however, recognised that it is difficult to link monetary JX>licy act ions directly
with overall economic: performance not only because of the lags hctwecn actions and
the outcomes but also because of the ellccts of other economic policies --- Ilse-al, income
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and sectoral policy measures. In the context of the conduct of monetary policy In
Nigeria, it is perhaps more rewarding at this point to identify the main constraining
factors in the implementation and achievement of the policy package. 1be decade of
the 1970s perhaps provided the first major test of monetary management in the
Nigerian economy. The monetary policy problems that appeared to have emerged
during this period included those of the monetary control framework, the interest rate
regime and Federal Government fiscal operations which were not effectively ham10nised monetary policy. We will touch on these only briefly because they will be subject
to detailed analysis later. The monetary control framework which relied heavily on
credit ceilings and selective controls increasingly failed to achieve the set monetary
targets because their implementation became less effective with time. The rigidly
controlled interest regime and especially the low levels of the various rates helped to
encourage inflationary monetary expansion while not promoting the rapid growth of
the money and capital markets. The low interest rates on government debt instruments
could not attract private sector savers and since the CBN was required by law to absorb
the un-subscribed portion of government debt instruments. substantial high-powered
money was usually injected into the economy. The interest rate regime did not also
allow for the growth of the capital market as the development banks, for instance,
could not obtain funds from the market while being obliged to charge low interest rates
for their operations. Government fiscal operations even at that point of buoyant oil
revenue emerged as a critical factor in monetary policy. During the period, as a result
of the oil boom. large amounts of financial resources accrued to both the public and
private sectors. Government revenue, for instance, was dominated by oil earnings in
foreign exchange resulted in large increases in government expenditure which caused
monetary instability. When the oil receipts were not adequate, and in order to maintain
the levels of expenditure. government resorted to borrowing from the Central Bank to
finance huge deficits which was also clt-tri111ental to monetary stability.

!'Alff II

'lliE DESIGN AND IMl'LEMENTA'llON OF
MONETAY POLICY UNDEI{ ECONOMIC C'RISIS

The performance of the Nigerian crnnomy between 1980 and 1985 contrasted
sharply with the observed trend in the l 970s analysed in Part I. Ernnomic policy
changes that were required to put the economy back on the right course were not
seriously considered until l985a11cl. in thet·ve11t. monetary management came under
more severe strains than in the previous five years.
11-.e Economy And Policy Strntcgics

To all intents and purposes. the oil boom of the 1970s rame to an end in the early
1980s although the recession that emerged at the time was thought to be temporary.
To recapitulate. the oil boom of the 1970s brought with it several changes in the
Nigerian economy. The most critical change was the eronomy's heavy dependence on
petroleum exports as the main source of foreign exchange and government revenue.
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At the beginning of the decade, the oil sector accounted for about 20 per cent of GDP.
but provided as much as 80 per cent of total government revenue and over 96 per cent
of foreign exchange receipts. Another consequence of the oil syndrome was the rapid
decline of the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector which used to supply the
bulk of foreign exchange receipts in the 1960s gradually lost its International
competitiveness arising from the combined effects of the local ovenraluatlon of the
naira exchange rate, inadequate pricing policies and general neglect of the rural
economy. During the decade of the 1970s, the share of the agricultural sector out of
GDP fell by half to only 20 per cent. while the economy increasingly depended on food
imports to feed the population. Generally, there was no encouragement to engage in
non-oil exportation because the existing structure of incentives and the controls
favoured mainly import-oriented production and consumption patterns. One fundamental change resulting from the oil boom was the unusual growth of the public
sector which became the prime mover of economic activities through its huge capital
investments In social, physical and economic infrastructure. By the early 1980s, the
Government sector accounted for about 50 per cent of GDP and 60 per cent of
employment In the modem sectors. The Federal Government alone owned nearly 200
non-commercial and commercial parastatals while each of the State Governments
owned substantial number of such parastatals all of which were wholly financed from
oil resources.
However, the world oil market collapsed in mid-1981 just as dramatically as the
boom started In 1973/74. Crude oil exports, for Instance, which reached a peakof2.2
million barrels per day (mbd) in 1979 fell to 1.23 and 1.0 mbd in 1981 and 1982, while
crude oil export prices which climbed to a peak of US$ 40 per barrel In 1981 fell to US
$29 per barrel In 1983 and only US$ 14.85 per barrel In 1986. As a result, foreign
exchange receipts which reached a peak of US $24.9 billion In 1980 fell to US $17.2,
US $12.8, $10.1 and only US $5.2 billion In 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1986. respectively.
Thus, with the reduction of the country's foreign exchange earning capacity to a
quarter of itc; initial potential, the development strategies in vogue during the decade
were apparently in disarray. At first, it was hoped that the adverse development in the
International oil market would be short lived. Indeed, Government's first main reaction
was to intensify con trnl measures which might dampen aggregate demand and thereby
restore external equilibrium. In this connection, the Economic Stabilization Act
promulgated by the Federal Government in April 1982 was designed to arrest further
deterioration of the economy through rrtore stringent exchange control measures and
Import restrictions supported by appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. In October
1985, the Federal Government declared a 15-month Economic Emergency period
which resulted in further controls such as reduction of personal and company
incomes.
Monetary Policy Objectives And Instruments

Monetary policy objectives during the period remained as in the past- stimulation
of output and employment, promotion of stable prices and support of external
equilibrium. The direct monetary control framework was generally retained and this
entailed, among others, the prescription ofaggregate credit ceilings, the use of selective
credit controls, the imposition of some resenre requirements and maintaining a lid on
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interest rates as ~ means of ipducing an increase in productive capacity.
The permissible aggregate credit expansion ceilings were on the downward trend
during the period, pointing to the intention to restrain the growth ofliquidity demand
pressures in the economy. The credit expansion ceiling on banks which was 30 per cent
between 1980 and 1982 was reduced to only 7 per cent in 1985. The small banks were
usually given some concession to extend more credit either in the form of a slightly
higher credit ceiling or as a proportion of their total deposit liabilities 01 • Over the years,
certain categories of loans were excluded from credit ceilings. These included loans
granted for the purchase of shares by Nigerians under the Indigenisation Programme,
loans for buying motor cars by eligible workers and loans for agriculture and residential
building construction above the prescribed minimum. The guidelines on the sectoral
allocation ofbanks' loans and advances generally favoured the preferred sectors. During
the review period, the preferred sectors were allocated 75-79 per cent of banks' loans
and advances, while the less-preferred sectors were to be allocated the balance. In
addition, the guidelines made some stipulations in respect of the distribution of
merchadt banks' assets portfolio, the general aim being to induce them to lend for longterm investment. In 1980, the merchant banks were to ensure that a minimum of 40
per cent of their total loans and advances was of medium and long-term nature with
a maturtty of not less than three years, while a maximum of 20 per cent of such loans
and advances could be for short term projects maturing within one year. In 1985, the
proportion for medium to long-term loans and advances was raised to 50 per cent.
Selected credit controls were also used to encourage indigenous businesses, small
scale enterprtses and the rural areas. The stipulated minimum proportion ofloans and
advances that commercial banks were required to grant to Indigenous borrowers
Increased from 70 per cent In 1980 to 80 and 90 per cent in 1982 and 1984,
respectively. Out of those proportions, the small scale indigenous enterprises were to
be allocated proportions fixed at an average of 16 percentage points during the review
pertod. In 1982, the guidelines began allocating certain proportions of rural bank
deposits as loans to ~ral borrowers. In that year, banks were required to lend not less
than 30 per cent of the total deposits collected by their rural branches to customers
In the rural areas. Tots proportion was raised to 40 per cent in 1985.
Reserve requirements remained generally unchanged during the period. The
minimum liquidity ratio remained at 25 per cent, while the minimum cash ratios
remained in the range of2-5 per cent depending on the deposit holdings of banks. The
cash advance deposits for Imports required earlier were unfrozen In 1980, but restored
again irr 1982. The lid on Interest rates generally remained with only marginal upward
adjustments taking place. Within the minimum lending rates fixed for banks, various
sectors and actMtles enjoyed preferential treatment, while the specialised financial
Institutions were obliged to lend at stipulated rates and obtain deposits also at
controlled rates. Interest rates on government debt Instruments and bank deposits
were also rigidly controlled.
Monetary And Credit Developments

As shown In Tables 3 and 4, there was a rapid growth In domestic liquidity between
1980 and 1985. Broad money [M2) increased by 46.1 per cent tn 1980 alone and
Increased further by an average of 10.6 per cent a year in the rest of the period.
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Similarly, narrowmoneygrewby50.l percentln 1980andby7.6percentayearduring
the rest of the period. The rapid monetaiy expansion in 1980 followed the pattern of
the oil boom period and was particularly reminiscent of the 1974-1979 period,
characterised by heavy government spending of oil earnings which were largely
monetised. After the temporaiy setback in the oil market in 1978/79, oil prices
recorded a sharp increase in 1980 which resulted in enhanced oil revenues. In the rest
of the period, however, the rates of monetaiy expansion were substantially reduced
because of the rapid decline in net foreign assets of the banking system following the
crash of the international oil market. During this period, domestic money creation was
spurred by the high rate of domestic credit expansion.
In general, compliance with the credit guidelines was unsatisfactory during the
period. With regard t6 the ceilings on aggregate credit extension by banks, compliance
was forced on the banks only when there was inadequate demand for credit from the
private sector, especially between 1982 and 1985 when the economy was already in
a deep recession. During 1980 and 1981 when the economic situation was still fairly
buoyant. the banks, for instance, exceeded the permissible growth rate of 30 per cent
by 3.3 and 5.2 percentage points. In the subsequent three years, 1982-1985, they
kept well within the credit target growth rates even when it was limited to only 7 per
cent in 1985. With respect to the sectoral credit guidelines, it proved rather difficult to
keep the banks within the targets, with the merchant banks always the bigger
defaulter. On·an average prescription of 75 per cent of total credit to the preferred
sectors, the commercial banks achieved an average of69. l per cent between 1980 and
1985, while the merchant banks achieved 62.8 per cent out of the prescribed 79 per
cent. Consequently, both commercial and merchant banks extended more credit to the
less-preferred sectors than was stipulated. The commercial banks exceeded the targets
byan average of6. l percentage points, while the merchant banks exc-1-eded their own
targets by an average of 16.2 percentage points.
Macroeconomic Indicators
As stated earlier, while there is need for caution in linking the outcomes of monetary
policy directly with overall economic performance, there is nevertheless a need to
indicate the extent of achievement of the objectives which monetaiy policy was to assist
in attaining. The growth and employment objectives was certainly not achieved in the
review period. After the impressive output growth estimated at 5.4 per cent in 1980 the
economy experienced declines in output between 1981 and 1984 [see Table 5). In 1985,
a high growth rate in output of7.4 per cent was recorded which was exceptional and
largely due to the rapid recovery following the good spell of favourable weather for
agricultural production. Due to the inadequate growth in the economy, new employment opportunities virtually dried up and, indeed, the spate of labour disengagement
which characterised the early 1980s ·continued till 1985. 'Ille down-tum in the
economy resulted from the drastic decline in oil export earnings and revenue. Imports,
particularly of capital goods and raw materials fell sharply and this made It extremely
difficult to sustain the "!Conomy's production capacijy which had thrived on foreign
inputs. The average inflation rate during the period, estimated at 17 .8 per cent per year
was slightly less than the average of 20.3 per cent in the preceding five-year period.
Si~gle digit inflation rates were recorded in 1980, 1982 and 1985. but the rates
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recorded In 1981. (20.9%), 1983 (23.2%) and 1984 (39.6%) were much higher than the
long-term average for the economy. By and large, the Inflationary pressures which were
building up during 1975-1979 were sustained in the review period. 1be objective to
maintain external equilibrium was also not attained except in the earlier part of the
period when the balance of payments position recorded declining but modest
surpluses. In 1984 and 1985, however, balance of payments deficits were recorded.
Furthermore, a new and serious phenomenon that would later change the overall
picture of the external sector position was emerging during the period. 1bis was the
problem of external debt burden. 1be total external debt outstanding moved from only
N2.3 billion In 1981 to N 10.6 billion in 1983 ana Nl 7.3 billion in l 985.1be debt seFVlce
ratio increased from only-5 per cent in 1981 to 33.2 per cent In 1985.
Problems o.f Monetary Policy

Again, we shall only review briefly the problems of monetary policy during this period
since the recurring Issues will be fully discussed later. 1be main problems are a carryover from the decade of the 1970s. First, the inadequacy of the monetary co~trol
framework was clearly reflected in the developments during 1980---1985. The central
monetary authority had no efTeclve grip on the growth of monetary aggregates In line
with the stipulated targets. 'lbe sectoral credit controls were also not very effective. The
firm control over interest rates and the exchange rate was also a source of instablllty
In the monetary control regime. The low levels oflnterest rates continued to be a source
of Inflationary monetary expansion especially from the angle of domestic debt management. 'lbe overvalued exchange rate of the nalra put considerable pressure on the
external sector and control of monetary expansion through the fluctuations in net
foreign assets. Government fiscal operations similarly constituted a major constraint
on effective monetary control. During the period under review, the Central Bank's
financing of government deficits assumed a more ~rious dimension In contrast to the
1970s when the rapid monetisation of oil receipts was the main problem. But
unsustainable high government spending was a common feature since the early
1970s. In the period under review, the use of Ways and Means advances by the Federal
Government to bridge shortfalls In revenue became pronounced. This Is a highly
inflationary method of financing the budget deficit and Its growtng magnitudes were
unhelpful to monetary control.
PARflll

1liE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENJ'ATION OF MONETARY
POLICY UNDER ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
In parts II and III of this paper, we highlighted the problems facing the Nigerian
economy as a result of the downturn in the international oil market which drastically
reduced foreign exchange earnings and government revenue. The situation was
particularly serious between 1982 and 1985 when stringent economic controls were
not effective in arresting the deteriorating situation. Inevitably, a period of economic
adjustment had to come and this started in 1986 wtth the adoption of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP). The aim of this part is to review the policy strategies
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under SAP. as well as the nature and performance of monetaiy policy under the
programme.
Policy Strategies Under Economic Aqjustment

The overall aim of the economic adjustment process embarked upon by the Federal
Government in July 1986 was to restructure the production and consumption
patterns of the economy. through the elimination of price distortions and reduction of
the over-dependence of the economy on the export of crude oil and imports of raw
materials and consumer goods. Three basic policy instruments were designed to
achieve this overall objectives. These were the adoption of a realistic exchange rate
policy coupled with the liberalisation of the external trade and payments system, the
adoption of relevant pricing policies in all economic sectors with greater reliance on
market forces and consequent reduction in complex administrative controls, as well
as further rationalisation and restructuring of public expenditure and customs tariffs.
We do not need to restate all the measures adopted under these Instruments because
they have been adequately covered by several authors121. But we can recall notable
measures such as the introduction of the foreign exchange market which resulted in
a depreciated naira exchange rate, the dismantling of import and foreign exchange ·
controls, the overhauling of customs and excise duty schedules. the design of
Incentives to promote non-oil exports. the reforms of the public enterprise sector and
implementation of a more dynamic• external debt management strategy. Monetary
policy was to play a unique role in the new economic management process.
Monetary Policy Objectives And Instruments

Generally. the paramount objectives of monetaiy policy remained as in the earlier
periods - stimulation of output and employment. promotion of stable prices and
support of external equilibrium. However, while the need to attain these objectives was
certainly more urgent in a period of economic adjustment, monetary policy was also
to induce, more than hitherto, the emergence of a market-oriented financial system for
effective mobiliY..ation of financial savings and efficient resource allocation. The
monetary control framework remained essentially the same, except that some complex
selective credit controls were relaxed. while Interest rates were free of controls In 1987.
Thus. credit ceilings, selective credit controls and the liquidity and cash requirements
were still in vogue at the Inception of the programme.
Basically, the monetary policy measures adopted under the programme were
designed to dampen inflationary pressures and restrict the demand for available
foreign exchange resources. In August 1986, for instance. the CBN required the banks
to deposit in a non-interest bearing deposit account at the Bank the naira equivalent
of all outstanding external payments arrears. A total ofH4.2 billion was deposited with
the Bank as a result of this exercise. There was further restraint on bank's credit
expansion. The 10 per cent ceiling imposed on the rate of credit expansion by banks
fixed in January 1986 was reduced to 8 per cent in July and maintained until August •
1987 when It was further reduced to 7.4 per cenf. However, under the reflationary
package of 1988, the ceiling on credit expansion by commercial banks was raised to
12.5 per cent. Due to the excessive inflationary pressures generated by the rapid
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monetary expansion arising from that package, the rates of credit expansion by the
banks were reduced later In 1988 and early In 1989 when the annual rate was fixed
at 10 per cent. Probably the most pungent efforts to reduce the excess liquidity of the
banking system were the abolition of foreign guarantees/currency deposits as
collaterals for naira loans and the withdrawal of public sector deposits from the banks
and their consolidation at the CBN. 1be abolition of foreign guarantees/currency
deposits as collateral for naira loans meant that commercial and merchant banks were
no longer to grant domestic loans denominated in naira on the securities of foreign
guarantees or deposits held abroad and In domiciliary accounts with the banks. The
withdrawal of public sector accounts from the banks arose from the treasury circular
of May 26, 1989 directing all government al:counts to be kept with the CBN. Although
the Federal Government later granted some concessions on this general requirement,
Its Immediate impact was to reduce substantially the system's liquidity. By July 31,
about N8.3 billion had been deposited with the CBN.
A part of the SAP economic liberalisation measures, the sectoral credit guidelines
were reformed to give banks the much needed flexibility in their credit operations. The
sector-specific credit distribution targets were further compressed into four sectors In
1986 and two sectors in 1987. Under the two-sector categorisation, agriculture and
manufacturing enterprises were regarded as priority sub-sectors while all other subsectors were grouped as "others". The guidelines regarding credit extension to smallscale indigenous enterprises and rural areas remained broadly the same as In the preSAP period.
Similarly. interest rate management departed radically from the pattern of the past.
Initially, actions favoured the upward adjustmer;it of the interest rate structure in
pursuit of one of the alms of SAP to Improve the efficiency of the financial system In
mobilizing savings and improving resource allocation. In August 1987, all controls on
Interest rates were removed In total support of the strategy of economic deregulation
under SAP. The CBN rediscount rate was also adjusted upward and In consequence,
the interest rates on treasury securities moved up in order to encourage the private
sector non-bank public to Invest in government securities. In November 1989, the
CBN, convinced that the interest rate regime even under deregulation should stimulate
savings and investment issued some guidelines on the spread of bank interest rates.
For Instance, the spread between savings deposit and prime lending rates for each
bank was to be kept at a maximum of71/2 percentage points, while the margin between
the prime and the highest lending rate for each bank was to be kept at a maximum of
4 percentage points. It was also stipulated that the inter-bank interest rate was to be
at least one percentage point below the prime rate for each lending bank.
Monetary And Credit Developments

Except for the decline in narrow money in-1986 due to some special developments,
the period 1986-1989 witnessed another rapid growth in domestic liquidity. Narrow
money [M' I fell by 5.~ per cent in 1986 due to the significant contraction In the "oj]er"
assets (net) of the banking system which was attributable largely to the rapid build up
of "other" liabilities of the CBN following the call on authorised dealers of fm:eign
exchange in August and October 1986 to transfer to the Bank the naira lodgements
in respect· of foreign exchange arrears which could not be effected due to foreign
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exchange shortfall. In addition, the fall in the value of the nalra led to a revaluation of
the CBN's medium- and long-term liabilities, while the bankers' deposits in their
Second-Tier Foreign Exchang~ Market [SFEM) accounts with the bank rose. However,
between 1987 and 1989, M1 increased at an annual rate of27.5 per cent while the
increase of 44.2 per cent in 1988 alone was only a little lower than the record increase
of 50.1 per cent in 1980. Except in 1989 when the major factor responsible for the
increase in M1 was the rapid expansion of net foreign assets, the monetacyexpansion
during the period was due to the increase in aggregate bank credit to the economy and
in particular to the private sector. The movement in broad money [M2) folio~ the
pattern described for M1, its major component. It increased moderately in 1986 and
1989, but grew vecy rapidly at an average of 33 per cent in 1987 and 1988.
The banks generally failed to comply with the credit ceilings. The commercial banks,
for instance, exceeded by wide margins the credit targets in 1986 and 1988, while they
moved quite close in 1987 and 1989. The merchant banks operated within the credit
guidelines in 1988 but exceeded them significantly in 1989. 1be commercial banks
also did not keep to the sectoral credit targets except for their allocations to agriculture
In 1988 and 1989 when they exceeded the minimum stipulations marginally. In all
other years and for all sectors, they usually fell below the stipulated targets. The
merchant banks generally performed better than the commercial banks. In 1988 and
1989, they complied fully with the sectoral credit targets, while defaulting in 1986 and
1987.
.
Macroeconomic Indicators

Overall, the implementation of adjustment policies produced a substantial positlvc
economic impact, although one could not envisage of a complete economic recovecy in
the four years under review. Output growth was impressive with the GDP growing
positively each year with an average of3.6 per cent. in contrast to the decline between
1982 and 1984 and the average: growth rate of 1.6 per cent between 1980 and 1985.
1be generation of new employment improved although the unemployment rates In
both urban and rural areas were still rather high. 1be growth in output and
employment was made possible by the improved levels of oil exports, revenue and total
imports. However, the much depreciated naira exchange rate had resulted in reduced
purchasing power as inllationacy trends persisted. During the first two years of
adjustment, the inflation rate averaged only 7.8 per cent a year. As a result of the
reflationacy package ofl 988 which also had a spill-overetTect in 1989, the inflation rate
reached 38.3 per cent In 1988 and an all-time high of 50.5 per cent in 1989, The
external sector position was also not particularly satisfactocy. The balance of payments
position recorded deficits in 1986 and 1988 and a marginal surplus In 1987. However,
the surplus ofNS. 7 billion recorded in 1989 was the highest in the decade of the 1980s.
This "tum-around" was partly due to non-settlement of certain obligatton,s falling due.
Indeed, the external debt position assumed a more serious dimensi+n ..The total
external debt outstanding which was only N41.2 billion in 1986, r~ched Nl00.8
billion, Nl34.0 billion and N240.4 billion in 1987, 19Baand 1989, tes~tlvely. Thus,
while the economy had begun to respond positively to the adjustm t policies. it
remained very fragile and the general trends of macroeconomic indica ors indicated
that monetary policy continued to come under severe strains and stresses.
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Problems of Monetary Policy
Out of the monetary policy problems inherited from the 1980---1985 pertod, quite
a few were addressed during the period of adjustment between 1986 and 1989. Those
dealt with included the simplification of the sectoral credit controls. the deregulation
of interest rates and adoption of a market-related determination of the naira exchange
rate. To a large extent, these actions were compatible with the main thrust of monetary
policy. However. the fundamental constraints on monetary policy remained. The
ineffectiveness of the direct control framework persisted and its shortcomings were
quite significant, while government fiscal operations continued to constitute a
destabilising factor in monetary rrtanagement."'I11ese issues need further articulation
as they will determine the· future course of monetary policy in Nigeria.
(a)

Credit Ceilings

Credit ceilings as used in CBN monetary policy during the decade were q ua11 lit alive
limits [percentages) to ensure that domestic credit expansion and !ht· 111011l'lary
implications of the balance of payments target would match the cxp<Tll'd i11('rease in
the demand for total liquidity in the economy. The quantitative lim ii s W<'n · derived from
the monetary survey of the banking system. The balance sheet ich-11lily used was:
dM 2 = [dM1 + dQM) = dDC + dNFA + dOA ......... (I)
where "d" stands for "change in"
M2 = broad money supply;
M1 = narrow money supply;
QM = quasi money [savings and time deposits);
NFA = net foreign assets;
DC = total net domestic credit; and
OA = other assets [net).
When a stable money demand equation is introduced, the identity becomes meaningful
since it permits the matching of aggregate demand with available resources. The level
of domestic credit consistent with targeted changes in net foreign assets, other assets
[net). and the projected demand for liquidity was obtained as a residual by suhl ract ing
net foreign assets and other assets from total liquidity, i.e.
dDC = dM2 - [dNFA + dOA) . .. .
(2)
The increase in domestic credit was then allocated between the public and prtvate
sectors through an assumed banking system financing of the fiscal deficit. A5 presently
practised, the permissible change in credit to the private sector is distributed quarkrly
for the year on the basis of observed seasonal behaviour of demand for credit.
As we have shown earlier in this paper, it has proved difficult to achieve the monetary
targets under the use of credit ceilings since tlieir Inception. Even during the pericxl
of adjustment. the gaps between the targets and actual growth rates in credit to
government and the private sector have been too large for comfort. Similarly. the gaps
be~een the targets and actuals for the intermediate monetary variable [M 1) have been
disturbing. Without doubt, credit ceilings could be very effective in restraining
monetary growth, especially at the initial stage of their application. But their
implementation tends to be ineffective with time. The Nigerian experience has revealed
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problems relating to the vatylng composition of credit. the enforcement of the ceilings
and the relative efficiency of the control system. On the composltlon of the credit limit,
many items of credit were from time to time excluded frorti the credit ceiling for
justifiable reasons, but this action gradually eroded the effectiveness of the ccillngs.
Past examples of such exemptions, as indicated earlier, were loans for the purchase
of vehicles by workers, the purchase of shares under the indigenisation Decree and
excess loans over and above the sectoral allocations to agriculture and residential ·
housing construction. Also, money at call with other banks and loans granted for the
purchase of shares of privatised companies under the privatisation and ~mmercialisation programme of the Federal Government were excluded from the ceilings at
some points. Some of these exceptions could conceal excessive credit operations, just
as the large growth in bankers' acceptances, commercial papers, loan swaps, interbranch accounts, leasing and investments which were not part of credit under the
guidelines during the period. Another possible source ofexcessive credit expansion has
been the small and new banks which were allowed larger ceilings to enable them grow.
The rapid growth in the number of new banks since 1986 would have added some
impetus to this development. It should also be noted that the cq;ditguideli11,es excluded .
the increasing large number of non-bank financial instltuttorM'like ins~ce compa-. ~nies, pension and provident funds, credit and cooperative societies and finance
companies whose role in financial intermediation has increased tremendously.
1be above factors also created problems of enforcement which could be worsened
by the lags in obtaining and processing data from the banking system. Banks are
currently given up to the end of the subsequent month to render returns on their
operations for a particular month. Since a lot of time is needed to process and reconcile
the data, defaulting banks would not be detected promptly and could therefore
continue defaulting. Another problem ofenforcement artses from the growing problem
ofbad and doubtful debts which are compounded by many banks with due and unpaid
interest. This not only created uncertain assets but could help banks ~ credit
ceilings very easily.
,
The credit guidelines could hAve been a source of inefficiency in the banking system.
Permitting banks, irrespective of their efficiency. to grow by the same ratio as stated
in the guidelines tends to restrict competition in the system. It protects the weaker
banks, while it prevents the growth of the more efficient ones. This practice also favours
the larger banks with large turnover which permits them to accommodate new
borrowers. Direct credit controls could also prevent due recognition to important
changes in the economy such as the changing resources base of the banks. Undet the
circumstances, dynamic banks that aggressively mobilise sayings may not be adequately rewarded. Credit ceilings also promote the growth of credit and general
operations of the unregulated markets. There have been incessant allegatlonsofbanks
trying to circumvent the ceilings by acting as brokers between owners and borrowers
of funds which tends to diminish the efficiency of the financial system.
(b)

Selective Credit Controls

Selective credit controls have been used in Nigeril!C'as part of the contrbutions of
the monetary authorities to the process of accelerated economic development by
allowing easier credit access to the productive sectors. They are particularly useful in
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IDCs, where the money and capital markets are poorly developed. SpecUlcally, such
controls can be used to deal with bottlenecks, tnflatton and uneven growth in the
economy. The practice of selective credit controls has taken several forms in Nigeria as
indicated earlier. The commonest Is the sectoral allocation of commercial and
merchant banks' loans and advances within the overall credit limit. Agricultural
production and manufacturing enterprises are allocated the bulkofbankcredlt. There
ls also a regional dimension to the selective controls. For instance. banks have been
required to lend to rural borrowers a minimum proportion of total deposits mobilised
by their rural branches as a way to expedltlng the transformation of the rural areas.
Small-scale wholly Nigerian-owned enterprises, excluding commercial and trading
acttvtties. are also favoured under the selecttve credit controls. Among the selective
credit control measures also in use are the sspecUlcatlon of a desired maturity for
merchant banks' loans and advances, as well as the grace periods on loans to
agricultural enterprises and residenttal butldtng construction.
By and large. the selective credit control measures have been fairly effective In so
far as they were adhered to by the banks at reasonable levels ofperformance. The banks
have compiled where penalties have been strictly enforced. This has been the case with
the controls on credit to agriculture and small-scale enterprises where shortfalls in
credit granted in relation to prescribed ratios are deposited with the CBN and lent at
concessional rates of interest to some apex financial institutions such as the Nigerian
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) and the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and
lndust.ry(NBCI). However, there has always been some skepticism about the effectiveness
of the selective credit controls. It Is particularly difficult to monitor the end use of the
credit to see whether the stated purpose was actually adhered to in practice. In this
case, there ls the posstbtlity of a leakage which will make such selective controls
Ineffective. This Is the more unacceptable when considerable resources are used to
monitor them. In essence, the favoured sectors are being given subsidies because of
these selective credit control measures which may prevent the optimal allocation of
resources.
(c)

Cash and UqufdUy Ratios

As outlined earlier, the cash and liquidity ratios Conned another segment of the
monetary control framework. As defined by the CBN, the cash ratio was a proportion
of demand deposits of a commercial bank that should be held at the Bank. The
merchant banks were not required to keep such cash at the Bank. Both commercial
and merchant banks were required to observe liquidity ratios computed as proportions
of their current liabilities such as deposit llabtlitles, short-term inter-bank loans. net
balances with foreign branches and banks, free balances with the CBN. government
debt Instruments with a remaining maturity of less than three years and certificates
of deposit of less than 18 months to maturlty..The commercial banks usually were
required to maintain a higher minimum liquidity ratio than the merchant banks. The
cash and liquidity ratios could be used to restrain credit expansion but their
application makes them more suitable for prudentlal controls. The cash ratiowtth only
demand deposits as its base and required only of the commercial banks up to 1989was
too narrowly defined to make a stgniJlcant monetaiy Impact The commercial banks
could circumvent the ratio by switching to time deposits. As for the liquidity ratio, the
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inclusion of government securities as eligible assets reduces its effectiveness for
monetaJy control as their counterpart ts a net credit to government More importantly,
the liquidity ratios of the commercial and merchant banks have been much higher than
the stipulated minimum and will have to be fixed at substantially higher levels to make
them effective.
(d)

Covemment Fiscal Operations

The magnitude and pattern ofgovernment fiscal operations have been identtfled
as a major source of ineffective monetary control. With the exception of some years,
credit to the government usually exceeded the stipulated targets. During the period
under review, for instance, credit to government exceeded by far the targets setfor 1987
and 1988 when It increased by 14.4 and 30.0 percent. respectively, compared with the
set targets of 1.5 and 2:5 per cent in the two years. A stmllar situation could have
emerged In 1989 but for the consolidation of public sector deposits at the CBN which
substantially depressed the net credit to the government. In nonnal circumstances, if
the CBN could stick to the economy's computed credit absorptive capacity, credit to
the private sector should suffer with the increased credit to the government. This would
have amounted to crowding out of private investment which would not help the
achievement of the growth objective for which monetaJy policy was designed.
Since the credit guidelines were designed with a speclflc assumption of the
financing needs of the government, the actual outcome lnvoMng excessive credit to the
government would show that fiscal deficits had exceeded the Initial estimates. This has
been the pattern since the oil boom, and more so since the large reduction in the
revenue base. The excessive bank credit -to government has been a main source of
financing the growing fiscal deftcli. The major source of bank credit to government has
been the CBN. All other things being equal, this type of liquidity injection into the
economy Is highly Inflationary. the more so when It Is through the Ways and Means
advances. The high rates of Inflation observed in the past and the persistent
depreciation of the naira exchange rate had their roots In the large increases in
domestic liquidity especially during the period of economic adjustment. By and large,
monetary policy did not achieve the type of harmonisation with fiscal policy as
envisaged in the monetary framework. Under that circumstance, domestic price
stability and external equilibrium, both important objectives of monetary policy, were
difficult to achieve.

PARfIV
PROSPECfS FOR MONETARY POLICY IN TI-IE 1990s
The effectiveness of monetary policy in Nigeria in the 1990s will depend to a large
extent on reducing to the barest minimum those constraints identified in Part IV of this
paper. The adoption of the SAP had made a wodest start in that direction between 1986
and 1989. Further improvements were made or announced during 1990-1991 and
before we discuss the unfolding implications of the emerging monetary control regime,
there is need to highlight the main developments in 1990 and 1991.
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Deuelopments In 1990-1991

Several actions were taken in the 1990-1991 flscal years to strengthen the
monetaiy control process. Starting from 1990, the ceilings on bank credit expansion
were no longer to accommodate exceptions as before. Bank credit was to include loans
and advances, and investments including leasing assets and net intE;rbank 0oat such
as call money and certificates of deposit. Another important step taken to improve
monetary control was the decision to give equal treatment to both commercial and
merchant banks as opposed lo the situation when the merchant banks were usually
treated differently from the commercial banks. For practical purposes, the operations
of the two types of banks would affect the monetary process in the same way such that
the exclusion of the operations ofany of them would only serve to weaken the monetaiy
control system. Some of the actions taken to redress this particular problem Included
the bringing of merchant banks under the same credit ceilings as the commercial
banks and inclusion of their operations in the computation of the money supply and
demand. the equalisation of the liquidity ratio for the two types of banks and the
permission given to the commercial banks to engage In equipment ~aslng earlier
restricted to only the merchant banks. The reform of the cash reserve requirement In
1991 was another positive step to make monetary management more effective. As may
be recalled·. the cash reserve requirement stipulated for commercial banks up to 1989
and lncJudldng merchant banks from 1990 had been defined as the ratio of cash
reserves deposited with the CBN to total demand liabilities. From the 1991 flrscal year
however. The base for computing the cash ratio as expanded to include all de~it
liabilities comprising demand, savings and time deposits. For fiscal 1991, all commercial and merchant banks were required to observe a minimum cash ratio, as defined,
of3 percent at the end ofeach month. Another development that could assist monetary
control was the reintroduction of the issuance of stabilization securities by the CBN
to the banks in an attempt to drastically mop up the excess liquidity in the banking
system. The stablllzation securities, though non-transferable and non-negotiable
could in future be developed into marketable instruments which will be more suitable
for a market-based system of monetary control. However, as presently designed, It
could serve as an effective means of controlling the excess reserves of the banks.
Several measures were adopted In 1990 to strengthen the banking system which
Is important for effective monetary management. The first action was the increase In
the minimum paid-up capital of commercial and merchant banks in 1988 and 1990.
As of the later year, commercial and merchant banks were required to comply with the
stipulated minimum paid-up capital of H50 and H40 million, respectively. Early in
1990, the CBN brought Into force the risk weighted measure of capital adequacy
recommended by the Basie Committee of the Bank for International Settlements.
Under this directive. the banks were required to maintain at once capital funds which
as a minimum must not be less than 7.25 per cent of total risk weighted assets, which
will rise to 8 per cent from 1992. At least 50 per cent of banks' capital under this
directive must comprise primary capital (paid-up capital and reserves). Before this
directive was !sued, the adequacyofbanks' capital In Nigeria was measured by the ratio
of adjusted capital to total loans and advances outstanding. Again, late in 1990, the
CBN introduced a set of prudential guidelines for licensed banks which were
complementary to both the capital adequacy rules mentioned earlier and the statement
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ofAccounting standards for banks and non-bank financial Institutions. The prudential
guidelines and the standard accounting system, among others, spelt out criteria to be
employed by banks for classifying non-performing loans, the minimum amount of
provisions to be made for each category of such loans and the conditions attached to
interest recognition in respect of classified loans, as well as providing rules for
classifying banks' "other assets" and treatment of off-balance sheet transactions. In
conjunction with the on-going examinations of insolvent banks by both the CBN and
the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, the above actions are likely to promote a
sound and stable banking system particularly because of the rapid expansion of the
banking industry since the period of economic adjustment and the consequent
increased Iisk of failure and insolvency In the industry which, if not checked, would
erode monetary control efforts.
Three other policy actions In 1991 are worth mentioning. The first ts the new
directive on interest rates charged by banks on bank loans and savings deposits. We
have indicated the action taken In August 1987 to free Interest rates ofall controls such
that they will be determined by market forces. However, early in 1991, while accepting
the principle of the determination of interest rates by market forces, the CBN had to
presciibe a maximum margin between the banks' average cost of funds and their
maximum lending rates as well as a minimum level for their savings deposit rates. This
was not a retrogressive step as such because interest rate determination would still be
market-related through its link with the cost of funds. This action followed the
astronomical increases in bank lending rates In 1989 and 1990 even when the rate of
inflation was declining sharply and domestic liquidity had expanded rapidly. This
trend was seen as one of the side effects of deregulation which had Increased the
autonomous demand for funds and perhaps more importantly the lack of competttlveness in the money market. High Interest rates were likely to increase production costs
further and reduce investment and output which would be contrary to the aim of
monetary policy. Hence. the monetary authorities saw the Justification to take the
action which should be considered only temporary particularly when viewed In the
context of the unfolding monetary management framework. The other development in
1991 was the announcement by the monetary authorities that monetary policy would
shift from the system of direct control of credit growth to the market-oriented approach
based on generalised tools. The new system would depend on the use of such
instruments as cash reserve requirements, liquidity ratio and open market operations.
Adequate preparations would be made in 1991 to permit the application of the new
tools in the course of the fiscal year. The rest of this part of the paper ls now devoted
to examining the proposed techniques of monetary control and their Implications
especially when related to the monetary policy constraints discussed earlier.
Perhaps the most important development in 1991 was the promulgation of the
CBN Decree, No. 24 of 1991 and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree,
No. 25 of 1991 to replace the CBN Act of 1958 (including later amendments) and the
Banking Decree, 1969 (Including later amendments), respectively. Both Decrees could
substantially enhance the conduct of monetary management in the 1990s, especially
with regard to the technique of indirect monetary control. In this regard, the CBN in
consultation with the presidency can apply monetary policy instruments such as Open
Market Operations (OMO), reserve requirements,.stabilization securities and special
deposits to achieve the objectives of monetary policy. Essentially, the provisions of
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Decree No. 25 (Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree) specifically address the
problem ofloopholes in monetary management through the non-inclusion of financial
intermediaries other than banks In CBN's supervisory control. Now, these Institutions
will be licensed by the CBN and subject to Its guidelines regarding their operations.
Such guidelines wlll include th& requirement of specific data and other information.

11-.e Releoonce of Indirect Control of Money Stock
Our main concern here Is to briefly outline the mechanism of the Indirect control
of money stock and consider whether the Nigerian monetary system Is ready for this
type of control. 1be theoretical background provided In Part I has done a lot In painting
the picture of the nature Qfthe Indirect monetary control and so only the essentials will
be touched upon here. The method of Indirect monetary control basically Involves the
control of money stock through a manipulation of the monetary base defined as the
sum of total bank reserves (vault cash and deposits with CBN) and currency In the
hands of the non-bank public. 1be monetary base Is derived from net foreign assets
of the Central Bank (NFACB), net domestic claims on government (NDCGCB),
claims on commercial banks (CCB) and other assets (net) (OACB). The base so c.reated
Is used up as reserves by the banks (R) and currency outside banks (CP). These
variables as nonnally stated In the Central Bank's balance sheet has the following
Identity:
NFACB + NDCGCB + CCB + OACB = R + CP = H
(3)
Where H Is the monetary base (reserve money or high-powered money) which can
thus be derived either from the assets or liabilities side of the balance sheet. By
Influencing the reserves of the banks, In the desired direction, the CBN can alter the
money supply since available funds to banks for credit operations are correspondingly
affected. 1be process of money creation follows from the relationship which makes
changes in money supply dependent on changes In the money multiplier (m) and
changes in reserve money, that is M = mH. Assuming the money multiplier is stable
overtime. the money supply can thus be controlled by Inducing changes In reserve
money. over all. to control the money stock under the Indirect approach, the monetary
authorities apply the market-based lnstn1ments such as reserve requirements, the
rediscount rate and open market operations which have been defined In Part I of the
paper. In practical terms, the CBN under this approach will, as before. estimate the
desired money supply for the future period. It will then project the likely growth In the
monetary base and hence money supply If the Central Bank does not take any action.
The difference between the desired and likely levels of money stock will then result in
the determination of some gap In the supply of the monetary base which will point to
the appropriate action to be taken by the CBN.
The theoretical niceties apart. the pertinent question to ask at this juncture is
whether the Nigerian monetary system Is ready for this type of sophisticated monetary
management. The issue involved here is not really the logistical or infrastructural
problems envisaged as these can be eliminated over time, but whether the financial
markets are now well-developed to cope with the new system. One may recall that the
resort to the use of direct controls rather than the traditional instruments was
motivated by the absence of well-developed financial markets in developing countries
such as Nigeria. Are the financial markets now well-developed? Following the advent
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of economic and financial liberalisation in the 1980s especially in the developing
countries, it has been considered efficient to move away from rigid economic controls
with Its atte9dant distortions in the economy. Ultimately, direct control of monetary
growth must gtve way to an indirect control mechanism. Furthermore, emerging
evidence would seem to suggest that the use of indirect monetary instruments is not
only facilitated by the presence of the effective money markets, indicating some form
of symbiotic relationship between the two. Similarly, the determination to use these
instruments could hasten the elimination of the frtghtening infrastructural constraints that prevail in many developing economics.
In the specific case of Nigeria, let us review the possibility of developing a system
of open market operations, the core of an indirect monetary control system usually
supported by policies on reserve requirements and discount operations. There are at
least three conditions for the effective application of qpen market operations: welldeveloped financial markets in which a large volume of financial securities can be
traded; a well-developed secondary market In the securities and competitive Interest
rate structure to sustain the Interest of participants. These are not Impossible
conditions In the light of recent economic developments In Nigeria. There ts a large
stock ofgovernment securities outstanding, and new Issues are made regularly by the
CBN on behalf of the Federal Government. Treasury bills of three-month maturity are
issued weekly by subscription open to all institutions and the general public at an
interest rate one percentage point below the minimum redlscount rate. The CBN Is
presently obliged to take up the unsubscribed balance of treasury btll issue. At the end
of December, 1991, the total stock of treasury bill outstanding was N56. 7 b1llion of
which the CBN held N34.8 btlllon (61.4%). Treasury certificates, on the other hand,
have maturity of up to two years. At the end of December 1991, total treasury
certificates outstanding amounted to N34.2 billion out of which the CBN held N32.8
btllion (95.9%). Secondly, the possibility of developing a Virile secondary market In
treasury securities Is not remote. The cumbersome administrative procedures for bill
resale can be removed. Also, as the market grows, there will be no need for CBN to
redlscount an unlimited amount of btlls which has In the past discouraged the
emergence of brokers and Inter-bank operations. The low Interest rates can also be
adjusted towards market levels and once banks Intend to hold treasury securities for
purposes other than for meeting the liquidity ratio, such action will be useful for
monetary management. Thirdly, the problem of low Interest rates has been partly
solved by the deregulation of Interest rates and the introduction ofan auction-based
system for the issue of treasury securities. In this way. bank liquidity and interest rates
can be influenced through the Issue of the appropriate volume of securities for·sale In
the financial markets. This process could also acttva\e a secondary market In which
competent financial institutions and brokers could be allowed to deal. The CBN would
of course suppc;,rt the market through providing re.lJnanctng facilities though at penal
rates to discourage early redlscounttng which ts capable of discouraging- secondary
deals. In some circumstances, it may be possible to expand the scope of open market
operations through the sale and purchase of the central bank's own securities probably
tn addition to the deals In government securities. We have earlier made mention of the
possibtltty of developing the CBN stabtlimtlon securities Into such an Instrument. All
in all. while not underestimating the likely problems in.shlftlng to the use of Indirect
monetary control instruments, there ts real hope that these will be eliminated as the
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monetary authorities become more proficient in their use and greater experience ls
gained In other directions.
The Impl#cattons of Indirect Monetary Control

Although the Nigerian financial system has the features that can foster the
application of the indirect monetary toois. it nevertheless requires some associated
improvements in the macroeconomic, legal and regulatory environment of the
economy to make their use sustainable. The most urgent steps needed to hasten the
application of these instrum~nts include elimination of excess liquidity from the
banking system, harmonisation offiscal operations with monetary policy. resolving the
problem of insolvency in the banking system. monitoring the actMties of non-bank
financial institutions. expansion of money market actMty and improvement of the data
base. Each of these requires some articulation:
1.
As indicated earlier. there has been a substantial injection ofliquidity into the
economy, espedally since 1988, whkh has translated into hJgh levels of excess reserves
in the banking system. The main sources of Increased liquidity have been the large
divergence of government fiscal operations and financing needs from the projections.
as well as the higher than the prescribed growth rates of commercial and merchant
bank credit to the private sector. The excess liquidity in the banking system ls
inconsistent with the movement towards indirect monetary control. Ideally before the
system effectively takes off, the economy should be rid of such unwanted liquidity
otherwise it will be extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of the new monetary
control framework. The CBN in a bid to remove this excess liquidity has since August
1990 issued stabili?.ation securities to the banks in exchange for what ls determined
to be the excess reseives in the.banking system. In addition, the bank has continued
to penalise those banks that failed to comply with the quarterly credit ceilings.
2.
The fact that government fiscal operations have been more or less a persistent
source of excess liquidity injection shows that when the new system takes-off, there
would be need for greater harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies. Indeed. any
system of monetary control that does not do this ls bound to be unvlable. But in a
system which relies on the manipulation of the monetary base, uncontrolled borrowing
by government from the central bank directly affects the monetary base and money
supply and perhaps even in an unstable manner. However. It appears trivial to
advocate mere harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies because policy-makers
In the government and the central bank know the consequences of not doing so. It ls
thus cmclally important to probe the root cause of the problem which has been the level
and pattern of government expenditure.While measures such as the reform of tax
Instruments could be adopted to broaden the revenue base, substantial impact will
also be made in embarking on expenditure reforms. In the present Nigerian setting, the
serious Issues that need to be addressed include the sustainabtltty of present levels
ofexpenditure, the productlvenessofflscal planning and timeliness of producing fiscal
operations data.
3.
The system of indirect monetary control will engender keener competition in the
banking system because the financial markets will be the main determination of their
performance. Consequently, the existence of insolvent and illiquid banks will not
augur well for the efficiency of the financial system. Insolvency and illiquidity
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undermine confidence among banks and of the general public. Fortunately, this is one
problem which has received the bold attention of the monetary authortttes in recent
times. Reference has been made to the reform of the capital base ofbanks and the Issue
of prudential regulations and standard accounting formats. Joint action by the CBN
and NDIC has also resulted in the identification ofinsolvent banks in the system and
proposals have been made to restructure such banks. These proposals have to be
Implemented speedily as partial solutions will not be helpful.
4.
The phenomenal Increase In the number of banks and non-bank financial
Institutions has probably been more rapid than that of banks and yet they were not
until recently legally under the control of the CBN. These Institutions perform some
bank-like functions which cannot be subject to the same credit guidelines Issued to
banks. There has been the wide belief that banking institutions, which often have
Interests in these non-bank Institutions, use them to perform operations which would
otherwise have been disallowed under the current guidelines. To the extent that these
practices exist. they are a source of leakages In the monetary control system using
indirect tools. 1bus, there Is a need to draw up approprtate guidelines to brtng their
activities under the surveillance of the CBN.
5.
Further development of the money market Is veiy crttical for the effective
application of open market operations under the system ofindirect monetaiy control.
There will be need to Introduce non-treasuiy securtties Into the market presently
dominated by Federal Government securities which are largely controlled by the CBN.
There is also the bigger question of developing the secondaiy market. 1be concept of
discount houses will need to be developed as a means of underwriting government debt
instruments and thereby permit the conduct of open market operations. There Is also
need to extend brokerage services to other brokers beside banks as accredited official
dealers In government securities.
6.
To successfully conduct open market operations, the core of the Indirect
monetary control framework, requires timely data even on daily and weekly basis to
permit relevant intervention by. the CBN. The present lag In Information flow which is
as long as 2-3 months in many cases is not conducive to this system of monetary
control. For this system of control, timely data are required on current growth of credit
and money stock to be able to project their desired levels. the movement of ·the
monetaiy base. the levels and structure of interest rates and the ultimate variables
such as output. savings, investment and prices. 1be need for these sets of data would
call for huge investments to expand computer facilities at the CBN Head office with
direct linkages to all Its branches, a bold computerisation programme to be implemented by all financial institutions which will provide an effective communication
system between them and the CBN.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has traced the evolution of Nigeria's monetary policy and Its
performance since the early 1980s. To provide a background to the review, it discussed
the economic development strategy before the revie\j period. The highlights of the
Nigerian economy of the 1970s were the growing Importance of oil, the expanding role
of the public sector In the economy and the large dependence on the external sector.
Despite the fairly Impressive economic performance of the period, some economic
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problems such as growing fiscal deficits, external disequilibrium and inflatlonruy
pressures assumed more serious dimensions. In the prevailing circumstances,
monetary management Increasingly faced difficulties arising largely from the weaknesses of the monetary control framework and the large divergence of fiscal operations
from lhe set monetary and credit targets.
The oil boom of the 1970s came to an end in the early 1980s. Consequently.the
development strategies which were considered appropriate during that period became
inappropriate under the environment characterised by substantial reductions in oil
export earnings and revenue. Rigorous economic controls were mounted to stem the
deterioration. In that general framework. monetary policy applied more vigorously the
credit ceilings. selective credit controls and regtilatlon of interest rates. In spite oflhese
actions. monetaiy expansion was very rapid particularly In 1980 when a temporary oil
boom occ:m..-cd. While large moneti7.ation of oil earnings spurred monetary growth in
1980, ii was induced by high domestic credit expansion between 1981 and 1985.
Compliance with the credit ceilings and sectoral credit targets was unsatisfactory. Not
surprisingly. the economy faced recessionary trends between 1980 and 1985. 'The
growth in 011lput was negative accompanied by labour discharge and a high rate of
11nemploy111l·111. lnllaliona1y pressures were sustained, while balance of payments
dl'lkits Wt'H' ht·1·0111ing more frequent under a spectre of rising external debt burden.
The problems of mnneta,y policy were lai·gely a cany-over from the previous decade
and these i11dll(lccl the apparent inellectiveness of the monetaty control framework
based on dircd instruments and government fiscaloperationsespecially the i11creased
financing of fiscal ddlcits by the Central Hank.
The Struct11ral Adjustment Programme launched in July 1986 brought with it a
renewed philosophy of e('onomic deregulation that would lead to the elimination of
price distortions and a ressurgence of rapid growth In the non-oil sectors. The basic
lnstnunen ts of this new strategy were the adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy
coupled with the liberalisation of the external trade and payments system. greater
reliance on market forces in the detennination of prices and rationalisation of public
expenditure programme. Monetary policy, though having the same overall objectives
as before. was expected to play a unique role in resto1ing economic stability. The stance
of monetary policy was consequently a tight one so as to reduce the excess liquidity in
the system and generally maintain price stability. In order lo reduce credit expansion
by banks. credit ceilings were reduced and backed up by liquidity mopping measures
such as the withdrawal of all deposits on outstanding external payments arrears and
public sector deposits from the banks in 1986 and 1989, respectively. The sectoral
credit guidelines were reformed to give banks some flexibility in their credit operations.
while in August 1987, all controls on Interest rates charged by banks were removed.
Despite the good Intentions of monetary management. domestic liquidity expanded
substantially durtng the period, especially In 1988 and the main source was the
increase in aggregate bank credit lo the economy. ·similarly, banks' performance with
regard to credit ceilings and sectoral credit guidelines was very poor: The impact of the
SAP on the economy and in the light of the monetary developments was quite positive
In relative terms. but full economic recovery could not be achieved within the short
span of the programme. Nevertheless, the problems of monetary policy appeared to
have persisted in so far as the fundamental causes had not been removed. The
monetary targets were not being achieved because over time it became more difficult
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to enforce compliance particularly as frequent changes were made in the composition
of credit and timely data were not usually available. Also, the sectoral credit guidelines
were not usually applied by banks and tndeed the end use of the credit could not be
guaranteed. Above all. monetary policy did not achieve the type ofsynchronisation with
fiscal policy as envisaged In the monetary- control framework. When fiscal operations
deviated from the targets. monetary developments could not uphold the underlying
assumptions and hence. domestic price stablllty and external equilibrium which are
important objectives of monetary policy could not be assured.
Under these circumstances, a deliberate attempt would have to be made to
improve the efficacy of monetary policy In the 1990s. Towards this general direction.
the plan to shill lo the use of Indirect monet,;uy tools was formally announced early in
1991. But. apart from the llberalisatlon measures adopted since 1986, especially the
deregulation of interest rates, some actions had been taken since early 1990 to pave
way for the use of such Indirect monetary tools. These included the widening of the
definition of bank credit, the equality of treatment to all banks in the monetary control
process. the redefinition of the cash reserve requirement, the reintroduction of CBN
stablli7.atlon securities for mopping up liquidity and the exercise of bank restructuring
and other reforms embracing the increase In the paid-up capital of banks. the
Introduction of the risk weighted measure of capital adequacy. prudential guidelines
and uniform accounting standards as well as the promulgation of the CBN and the
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decrees (Nos. 24 & 25) of 1991.
The movement towards market-based instn1ments ofmonetaiy management in
a developing economy is unique and since financial markets are not fuliy developed,
it is appropriate to ask whether such a technique can be effectively applied. However,
one of the lessons of recent financial liberalisation measures world-wide is that such
measures do In fact foster the development of the financial markets which consequently assist in the application of the financial instruments. The available evidence
seems to suggest that the Nigerian financial system possesses the critical minimum
conditions for effective use of the market-based monetary inst rumen ts. In areas where
the conditions are not fully meet there is scope for improving the situation. To pave the
way for effective introduction of these insln1ments. vigorous efforts must be made to
eliminate the excess liquidity which has prevailed in the economy since 1988. ensure
continuous harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies. enthrone keener competition in the banking system. exercise effective control over non-bank financial
institutions to plug possible loopholes in the monetary control system and improve the
data base of the banking system.

NOTES
1.
For instance. in 1980, a small bank was defined as one whose loans and
advances fell below NI 00 million as at March 3 I. 1980, and was allowed to maintain
a credit ceiling of 40 per cent. Alternatively. such a bank could expand credit up to the
level lof70 per cent of its total deposit liabilities, excluding government deposits of not
more than six months' maturity.
2.
See for instance, studies by Omoruyi (1987, 1989), Ojo (1989, 1990), Odozi
(1988). Sanusi (1988) and some official documents such as Euromoney (1988 and
1990), and CBN (1988 and 1989)
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TABLE 1

MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS. 1970-79
(In per cent. except when indicated otherwise)

1970-1974

1975-1979

(Average)

(Average)

Narrow Money (M,)

·24.5

41.4

Broad Money (M2)

24.3

36.9

-16.5

161.6

19.9

39.3

-75.3

228'9

181.~

12.0

-25.7

-25.2

Indicators

A.

GROWili IN MONETARY AGGREGATES

Net Domestic Credit
Private Sector
Government
Net Foreign Assets
Other Assets (net)

B.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT/
GDPRA110

6.1

C.

GDP GROWili RATE

10.3

6.4

D.

INFLATION RATE

10.4

20.3

E.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSmON
(H million)

+659.2

-8.8

N
OI

TABLE2
n

i

MONETARY AND CREDIT TARGETS. 1980- 1989
(Percentages)

~

I
ii

1980

1981

CREDIT TO DOMESTIC ECONOMY
CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR
CREDIT TO GOVERNMENT SECTOR
BANKS' LOANS & ADVANCES
(I) Commercial banks
30.0
(ii) Merchant banks

23.7

30.0

1982

1984

18.7

30.0

25.0

12.5

24.4

19.3

GROWl1 I OF MI

1983

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

7.2
7.4
7.1

8.7
l2.8
5.9

4.4
8.4
1.5

8.1
13.3
2.5

9.5
10.7
8.3

7.0

10/8

8/7.4

12.5/7.1
12.5

10.0
10.0

6.5

7.8

11.8

15.0

14.6

I
8
r~

(i) Commerc1al banks

· 75

75

75

8

8

8

36
25

36
25

79
5
41
21

36
2:;

76
10
36
24

75
10
36
25

75
12
35
25

:5
44
22

7')

7!J

7V

79

79

79

5

5

:.,

41
21

41
21

6
41

8

41
21

5
41
21

78

50
15
35
50

50
15
35
50

50
15
35
50

50
10
40
50

50
10
40
50

50
10
40
50

(ii) Merchant banks

lligh priority 5ectors
N(ricullurc
Manufacturinl(
Other sectors

I
J

l3ANKS' LOANS & ADVANCES
13Y PURPOSE
lligh priority sectors
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Other sectors

!

21

56
21

TABI.E3
MONETARY AND CREDrf DEVELOPMENI'S. 1980 (N' blllion)

1989

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

CREDIT TO DOMESfIC
ECONOMY (NE11
, (i) l'rivalc Sc.-clor
(ii) Covcrnmcnl Scclor

10.8
7.2
3.6

16.3
9.7
6.6

21.9
11.4
10.5

28.2
12.4
15.8

31.l
12.9
18.2

32.7
13.7
19.0

36.8
17.4
19.4

46.9
25.5
21.4

57.3

49.3

29.8
27.5

30.9
18.4

FOREIGN ASSETS (Nf::11
OTIIER ASSl-::TS (Nf-::11
QUASI-M°'NEY
NARROW MONEY (M 1)
BROAD MONEY (M2)

5.6
(2.0)
,5.2
9.2
14.4

2.6
(3.3)
5.8
9.8
15.6

I.I

0.9
(9.7)
8.1
11.3
19.4

1.5
(11.01
9.4
12.2
21.6

1.8
(10.7)
10.5
13.3
23.8

5.0
(17.6)
11.5
12.6
24.1

8.1
(22.9
17.4
14.7
32.1

10.3
(24.8)
21.6
21.2
42.8

23.3
(26.3)
20.5,

(6.1)

6.8
10.1
16.9

1989

25.8
46.3

~

TABLE4
MONETARY AND CREDIT DEVELOPMENI'S, 1980 -

1989

(')

I

(Percentages)

Fl

I
li

I. CREDIT TO DOMESTIC
ECONOMY
2. CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR
3. CREDIT TO GOVERNMENT
SECTOR
4. FOREIGN ASSETS (NE:'O
5. NARROW MONEY (MI)
6. BROAD MONEY (M2)
7. AGGREGATE CREDIT CEILINGS
Commercial Banks
Merchant Banks
8. BANKS· LOANS & ADVANCES
BYPURl'OSE
(I) Commercial Banks
High priority sectors
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Other sectors
(IQ Merchant Banks
High priority sectors
Agrtculture
Manufacturing
Other sectors

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

34.7
17.8

28.6
8.6

10.5

4.8

4.9
5.9

12.5
27.0

27.4
46.6

22.2
16.9

·14.0
3.7

59.3

15.0
67.2
8.2
11.5

4.3
22.3
8.7
10.3

2.1
177.8
-5.3
1.3

10.3
62.0
16.7
33.2

28.5

3.1
8.7

50.2
-16.1
12.3
14.7

33.3

-33.1
126.2
21.7
8.2

35.2

19.7

8.0

3.1

5.5

29.0

11.6

19.1
10.4

10.8
33.2

70.0
7.2

69.3
7.2
30.5
30.7

67.9
8.2
28.4
32.1

68.2
8.8

68.4·

27.5
31.8

26.5

69.2.
11.8
41.6

31.6

30.8

41.9
12.9
29.1
58.0

45.4
15.3
30.1
54.6 ·

46.0
15.3
30.7
54.0

64.5
4.1

57.J
4.0

59.1

61.5

45.7
7.7

40.7

33.6

31.9

5.7
31.6

35.5

42.3

40.9

38.5

62.1
7.2
45.3
37.9

57.8
11.5
46.3
42.2

54.8

4.4

1980

1981

21.7
23.8

50.8
34.3

4.4
74.3
50.1

46.l

83.9
-54.3
5.6
8.0

33.3

70.8
6.8
30.8
29.2

68.4
4.9
41.9
31.6

30.9
30.0

65.8
4.6
42.1
34.2

.

-58.6

10.0

38.0
54.3

27.2

44.2

14.3
40.5
45.2

i

l
~

I
~

I"'

~

~

TABLE 5
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
(N billion)

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

cu~ FINANCING OF DEFICIT(%)

4.0
15.7

7.8
81.1

10.5
36.3

6.6
89.5

4.2
0.0

4.3
27.0

10.3
75.1

4.2
24.5

8.5
75.3

7.9
70.1

LE\"EL OF WAYS & MEANS
ADVANCES
GROWTh RATE OF GDP(%)
INFIATION HATE (%)
B.O.P. POSITION
CRt.:DE OIL EXPORTS
RE\"ENUE FROM OIL
TOTAL IMPORTS
E>..Tr:RNAL DEBT 01.JfSTANDING

5.4
9.9
2.4
13.6
12.4
9.1
1.9

0.8
·8.3
20.9
·3.0
10.7
8.6
12.9
2.3

3.8
-0:3
7.7
. 1.4
8.6
7.8
10.8
8.8

1.4
-5.4
23.2
-0.3
7.2
7.3
8.9
10.6

1.3
-5.1
39.6
0.4
8.8
8.3
7.2
14.5

0.8
7.4
5.5
0.3
10.9
10.9
7.1
17.3

3.0
3.2
5.4
-0.8
28.2
8.1
5.9
41.2

3.4
1.8
10.2
0.2
29.3
19.0
17.9
100.8

10.2
4.0
38.3
·2.3
28.4
20.9
21.4
134.0

14.6
5.2
50.5
8.7
55.0
41.3
30.9
240.4

FISCAL DEFICIT/CDP RA'l10 (%)
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